Parliamentary Control Over the Government in the Republic of North Macedonia: Reassessing Constitutional Accountability Through Comparative Constitutional Law

Abstract

The theory of the separation of powers remains one of the central issues in constitutional law. Within this framework, parliamentary control serves as a fundamental constitutional mechanism through which legislatures ensure executive accountability and preserve the balance between the legislative and executive branches.Although parliamentary constitutions provide various oversight instruments, including parliamentary questions, interpellations, inquiry committees and votes of confidence, their constitutional existence does not necessarily guarantee effective operation in practice. While constitutional scholarship has largely focused on the legal regulation of parliamentary oversight, comparatively less attention has been given to the relationship between constitutional design and institutional effectiveness.
This article examines the constitutional effectiveness of parliamentary control in the Republic of North Macedonia through a comparative analysis of Serbia and Slovenia. It argues that parliamentary oversight should be assessed not only by the existence of constitutional mechanisms but also by their ability to produce effective executive
accountability. The research employs a qualitative methodology combining doctrinal constitutional analysis, comparative constitutional law and institutional analysis,drawing upon constitutional provisions, parliamentary rules, official parliamentarydocuments, European Commission and other international reports, and contemporary
academic literature.
The findings indicate that the main weaknesses of parliamentary oversight in North Macedonia arise not from constitutional deficiencies but from limited executive responsiveness, insufficient institutional follow-up and weak parliamentary committee capacity. Comparative analysis demonstrates that stronger committee oversight,mandatory governmental responses, systematic post-legislative scrutiny and greater transparency significantly enhance parliamentary accountability. The article therefore proposes an Integrated Constitutional Accountability Model,arguing that effective parliamentary oversight depends on the interaction between constitutional design, parliamentary scrutiny, executive responsiveness, institutional follow-up and public transparency.